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The EU in the Western Balkans has been significantly engaged in the promotion of 
improved minority protection in the framework of its political criteria for accession. 
Despite the EU’s involvement in these policies, the question of how external 
pressures have affected and interacted with domestic institutional and policy changes 
is still not well understood. This paper sheds light on this debate by examining the 
interactions between the EU and national actors in the case of the Republic of 
Macedonia in relation to minority policies. The theoretical and methodological 
approach for this research largely follows the work of Hughes, Sasse and Gordon on 
the Eastern enlargement. The paper argues that political conditionality should be 
understood as a process encompassing both its formal and informal elements and 
emphasizes the problems of analysing minority conditionality as an independent 
variable. The analysis is focused on two examples: the adoption of the law on the use 
of languages and the policy of equitable representation of non-majority communities. 
The paper tracks and explains developments in EU conditionality in relation to 
minority protection over time through document analysis and interviews with various 
stakeholders.  
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As a candidate country for European Union (EU) membership, Macedonia is subject 
to conditionality in relation to minority policies primarily through the Copenhagen 
criteria for accession. According to the first Copenhagen criterion, in order to join the 
EU a new member state must ensure the stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
1 
Conditionality in relation to the protection of minorities was also part of the last 
enlargement round which was completed in 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania to the EU. In the Western Balkan countries that are in the queue for the 
upcoming enlargement, minority policies have been high on the EU accession agenda 
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primarily due to the legacy of recent inter- and intrastate conflicts. Scholars and 
practitioners have highlighted that the democratic consolidation of the region depends 
upon the management of minority issues (Gordon et al., 2008). 
In this context, the EU has significantly engaged in the promotion of improved 
minority protection in the framework of its political criteria for accession. Despite the 
EU’s involvement in these policies, the question of how external pressures have 
affected and interacted with domestic institutional and policy changes remains little 
understood (Sasse, 2005, 2009). On the one hand, studies guided by rational choice 
institutionalism do not see much space for the impact of the EU on minority 
protection because of the high associated domestic costs and the lack of consistency 
in the application of this norm. Empirical studies, on the other hand, have found that 
in some cases the EU has fostered interethnic cooperation, while in others it has 
increased polarization (Tesser, 2003; Schwellnus et al., 2009; Sasse, 2009). Overall, 
studies of minority politics and policies in the accession process have indicated the 
need for contextualized analysis of the EU’s impact, especially in the candidate 
countries for accession. 
 In light of the significance of the EU in domestic politics in the candidate 
countries, this paper extends the research from the previous enlargement to the 
Western Balkans, and examines conditionality in relation to minorities in the case of 
Macedonia. The theoretical and methodological approach for this research largely 
follows the work of Hughes, Sasse and Gordon on the Eastern enlargement (Hughes 
et al., 2005; Sasse, 2005). Hughes et al. argue for the need to study conditionality as a 
process by taking into consideration its formal and informal pressures, questioning the 
suitability of the external incentives model for studying ‘soft areas’ of the acquis 
communautaire (hereafter acquis), such as minority policies.
2 Focusing on dynamic 
interactions between the EU and the national level, and relying strongly on 
stakeholders’ views, this paper demonstrates the flexible nature of conditionality as 
well as its development and change over time.  
The analysis focuses on two key minority policies in Macedonia: the adoption 
of a law on the use of languages and the policy of equitable representation. The two 
examples illustrate changes in conditionality over time, the lack of consensus between 
stakeholders over the conditions, as well as its unwanted effects. Whereas the law on 
languages was not ‘officially’ considered part of EU conditionality, and was only 
included after its adoption at the national level, the policy of equitable representation JEMIE 2012, 3 
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has been at the core of EU demands since the signing of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) in 2001. By contrasting developments in these two 
cases, this paper demonstrates the dynamic nature of EU conditionality. Due to the 
difficulty of drawing clear causal relationships between the EU conditions and 
national policies, as well as to the different understandings of what EU conditions in 
this area are, the paper questions the viability of analysing minority conditionality as 
an independent variable. Moreover, with the latter policy of equitable representation, 
the paper illustrates the potential for unwanted effects of conditionality, even when 
there is consensus among the stakeholders on the stipulated conditions.  
The paper utilizes qualitative methods, i.e. document analysis and open-ended 
interviews. It is primarily based on EU and national documents prepared for the 
process of Macedonia’s European integration. From the perspective of the EU it 
examines the annual Progress Reports issued by the European Commission (EC) on 
Macedonia since 2005 and the Accession/European Partnerships prepared during this 
period. These two groups of documents provide important information on progress 
towards fulfilment of EU conditionality and they set short- and medium-term 
priorities for the country both in terms of political and economic criteria, as well as in 
relation to adoption of the acquis. On the national side, the paper looks into the yearly 
National Plans for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) and contributions to the 
progress reports from the national authorities. It also uses data from open-ended 
interviews in Brussels and Skopje with EU and national officials, as well as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks, conducted in late 2010 and early 
2011. 
The paper is organized into two major sections. The first section provides a 
background to political conditionality and minority policies in the context of EU 
accession. It reflects upon the disputed meaning of both these terms and explains how 
they are used in this research. The second section examines the understanding of 
minority conditionality in both EU and national documents in the post-2005 period in 
which Macedonia has been a candidate country, focusing on two thematic issues: the 
adoption of the law on the use of languages and the policy of equitable representation 
of non-majority communities.   
 Kacarska, Minority Policies and EU Conditionality 
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1. Minority policies and EU political conditionality  
‘Respect for and protection of minorities’ in the EU accession context 
Although included in the Copenhagen criteria and the regular European Commission 
(EC) progress reports, the meaning of the term “respect for and protection of 
minorities” in the EU context is subject to debate. From a legal perspective, De Witte 
concludes that the meaning of the term has not been developed in EU law (De Witte, 
2002). Similarly, Kymlicka points out that ‘Western countries differ amongst 
themselves in their approach to ethnic relations and attempts to codify a common set 
of minimum standards or best practices have proven difficult’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 1). 
Jackson Preece explains this difficulty by arguing that the identity of those persons 
who constitute a minority is dependent upon political and historical context, but is 
also influenced by international society (Jackson Preece, 2005: 182). Identity for the 
purposes of this study is understood in line with Tilly’s definition of ‘a potent set of 
social arrangements in which people construct shared stories about who they are, how 
they are connected, and what has happened to them’ (Tilly, 2003: 608).  
Soft law measures have been developing in light of these contextual 
specificities, but these are not accepted by all EU member states. Furthermore, in the 
enlargement process the EU has also been using minority protection standards 
developed by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of 
Europe (CoE). Sasse argues that ‘while the EU borrowed the link between democracy 
and human (and later) minority rights from the CoE, the OSCE provided the EU with 
the security-based rationale for minority protection’ (Sasse, 2006: 65). Kymlicka in 
turn highlights that the EU relies heavily on HCNM assessments in devising 
conditionality and assessing progress in the area of minority rights (Kymlicka, 2002: 
375). In addition to the OSCE HCNM, the CoE is also involved in minority rights 
monitoring through the reporting system established under various conventions within 
its framework. Most prominently, this includes ‘the Council’s Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, which by virtue of its binding character is 
considered as a breakthrough in minority protection’ (Liebich, 2002: 125). The EC 
commonly uses these reports when preparing its yearly progress reports and puts 
forward priorities in Accession Partnerships that are related to fulfilment of OSCE 
and CoE requirements. Due to the variety of organizations involved in this exercise, JEMIE 2012, 3 
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Sasse argues that EU conditionality in the area of minority protection is best 
understood as the cumulative effect of different international institutions (Sasse, 
2005).  
In response to the difficulties of setting unified standards of minority rights 
and their implementation, research has adopted context-specific definitions of 
minority policies in light of the elements under examination. In the context of EU 
accession, these have commonly included the adoption of non-discrimination 
directives, ratification of the CoE Framework Convention, and adoption of 
governmental strategies and programmes for the inclusion of the Roma minority 
(Rechel, 2008: 174). In addition, when examining minority policies in the context of 
EU accession, research has also focused on the development of citizenship policies 
and social integration of minority groups. Overall, the lack of a common standard of 
minority rights and its inclusion in EU accession policy has important implications for 
an analysis of minority rights, as it makes assessment of the impact of policies 
increasingly context-specific, as demonstrated by research in this area.  
The paper examines the issues which the EU has included in its reports under 
the headings ‘minority rights’, ‘cultural rights’ and ‘protection of minorities’, 
focusing on soft areas of the acquis. Doing so, the minority conditionality as 
understood in this paper fits within the broader definition of conditionality as a 
process, pointing towards the importance of the politics surrounding conditionality 
(Sasse, 2008). As a result, the study excludes non-discrimination directives which 
have commonly been addressed through compliance studies.  
EU political conditionality 
Minority policies are an element of “EU political conditionality”, which emphasizes 
‘respect for and the furtherance of democratic rules, procedures and values’ (Pridham, 
2002: 956). In its widest sense “political conditionality” is a policy instrument which 
involves ‘the linking of development aid to demands concerning human rights and 
(liberal) democracy in recipient countries’ (Sørensen, 1993: 2). This broader notion of 
political conditionality is most commonly used in development studies and although it 
shares some similarities with EU political conditionality, there is a substantial 
difference between the two (Crawford, 2001). The main instrument used in the former 
is the ‘threat of the reduction or ending of development assistance funds’ (Uvin, 1993: 
67–68). In turn, the main instrument used in EU political conditionality is the carrot of Kacarska, Minority Policies and EU Conditionality 
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membership, while the main threat is exclusion. In light of this difference, political 
conditionality has also been defined as a mechanism that ‘entails the linking, by a 
state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid, 
trade concessions, cooperation agreements, or international organization membership) 
to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the 
advancement of democratic principles’ (Smith, 2001: 37). When referring to EU 
conditionality, this research adopts the latter definition and focuses on the literature 
linked with the EU accession process.  
While research commonly uses both terms, Anastasakis argues, in his work on 
the Western Balkans, that the term “political conditionality” should be used instead of 
“democratic conditionality” (Anastasakis, 2008: 366). This argument underlines the 
political nature of this process, without the unquestionable inclusion of a 
democratization element. Anastasakis also highlights that ‘from a substantive point of 
view EU political conditionality can run counter to democratisation, at least in the 
short term when some of the prescriptions prioritize law and order instead of elections 
and/or civil society development’ (ibid). Accepting these critiques the paper operates 
with the term political conditionality, since it corresponds with the EU usage (i.e. 
political criteria) of this term, but also because the analysis does not presuppose the 
democratizing effects of EU conditionality.
3  
Despite its importance in the literature, a consensual definition of 
conditionality is missing both within the literature and in practice. The dominant 
approach for the study of EU conditionality in the accession context has been rational 
institutionalism. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have developed three models for the 
examination of the effectiveness of conditionality - the external incentives model, the 
social learning model, and the lesson drawing model - and have applied them in two 
alternative contexts: democratic and acquis conditionality (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005). In their research, conditionality is ‘a bargaining strategy of 
reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target 
government to comply with its conditions’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). 
The conclusions of their research indicate that rule transfer from the EU to the Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the variation in its effectiveness are best explained 
according to the external incentives model and are linked to the high credibility of EU 
conditionality and the low domestic costs of rule adoption (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005).  JEMIE 2012, 3 
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Though a leading analytical tool for the study of the effectiveness of EU 
conditionality, the external incentives model has difficulty accommodating minority 
policies. First, a core precondition for the success of the external incentives model is 
consensus and clarity of the rules, which is not the case with minority policies. 
Moreover, the external incentives model has been criticized because of the risk of 
overestimating the effects of EU conditionality. Bearing in mind that the process of 
Europeanization was simultaneous to the democratic transformation of these societies, 
separating the respective developments linked to each of them is increasingly 
difficult. As a result, demonstrating causal links between the impact of the externally 
induced conditions and the domestic policy choice is questionable.  
In response, empirical studies of conditionality have argued for a more flexible 
approach, which emphasizes its changes over time and the multiplicity of actors 
involved in its application. Hughes et al. argue that EU conditionality ‘includes not 
only the formal technical requirements on candidates but also the informal pressures 
arising from the behaviour and perceptions of actors engaged in the political process’ 
(Hughes et al., 2005: 2). Thus, they distinguish ‘between formal conditionality, which 
embodies the publicly stated preconditions [...] of the “Copenhagen criteria” and the 
[...] acquis, and informal conditionality, which includes the operational pressures and 
recommendations applied by actors within the Commission [...] during their 
interactions with their CEE counterparts’ (ibid., 26). This definition, according to 
Sasse, highlights the pitfalls of linear causality models and the inherent politicisation 
of conditionality over time (Sasse, 2009: 19).  
The latter process-based definition of conditionality underpins this study for 
several reasons. First, it provides for the possibility of examining the process of 
construction, application of conditionality and its outcome, thereby taking into 
consideration changes over time. Second, a narrow definition of conditionality is not 
appropriate because the ‘Copenhagen criteria do not define the benchmarks or the 
process by which EU conditionality could be enforced and verified’ (Hughes et al., 
2005: 25). The lack of benchmarks is particularly significant for minority 
conditionality as there is little guidance on criteria and substantial conditions within 
the EU due to the absence of EU norms in the field of minority rights. Third, the 
process-based definition of conditionality is necessary due to the contextual 
peculiarities of this process, since research has commonly argued that ‘the EU applied 
differentiated pressure across applicants, dependent on whether minority protection Kacarska, Minority Policies and EU Conditionality 
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was regarded as problematic and security relevant in the particular case’ (Schwellnus, 
2008: 187). Lastly, the process-based approaches highlight the importance of 
domestic actors for the success of EU conditionality and include them as important 
elements of analysis. Hence, this study is in line with Sasse’s understanding of 
minority conditionality as a construct, thereby recognizing that any notion of 
compliance is a construct and a political judgement (Sasse, 2009: 20). Acknowledging 
the contested notions of respect for minorities in the EU accession context and the 
flexible nature of EU conditionality, the following empirical part of the paper 
examines two specific examples of EU minority conditionality: the adoption of the 
law on the use of languages and equitable representation in the public sector.  
 
2. Minority policies and EU conditionality in the case of Macedonia  
Law on the use of languages  
The adoption of the 2008 Law on the Use of Language Spoken by at least 20% of 
Citizens in the Republic of Macedonia and in the Local Self-government Units 
(hereinafter ‘law on the use of languages’)
4 as an element of EU conditionality 
illustrates the significance of the informal pressures of the EC and the lack of a 
common understanding between actors at the EU and national levels as to what 
constitutes EU conditionality. The law on languages is mentioned directly for the first 
time in the Analytical Report 2005, in which the EC notes that ‘the coalition partners 
have agreed that, although not formally required by the Framework Agreement, a law 
on the use of languages should be adopted to complement the substantial number of 
existing specific laws specifying use of the Albanian language’ (EC, 2005). Similarly, 
the European/Accession Partnerships and Progress Reports between 2006 and 2008 
do not contain any direct reference to this law, which suggests that the EC did not 
include this requirement as a formal condition in the case of Macedonia.  
However, while the issue of the law on languages was formally left to the 
national level, national officials highlighted that there was informal pressure from the 
EC to adopt such a law. For example, a respondent said: ‘EU representatives in 
Macedonia insisted that we make a list of laws to be adopted for the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (OFA) implementation and one of the big differences between 
the coalition partners was whether we need a separate law on languages.’
5 This JEMIE 2012, 3 
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difference, as highlighted by my interviewee, is clearly visible in the national strategic 
documents for EU accession which show a mixed record with respect to the 
inclusion/non-inclusion of the law on languages for the purposes of EU accession. 
Contrary to the EC, in its answers to the Questionnaire for membership, the 
government at the time stated that ‘the only remaining law to be adopted in 
accordance with Section 6 [of the OFA] is the Law on Use of Languages of 
Communities in the Republic of Macedonia, which will be adopted in the first half of 
2005’ (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2005). Hence, while in its report 
the EC did not consider this law to be an OFA obligation, the government had a 
different opinion in 2005, when the country was under consideration by the EC to 
become a candidate for EU accession. Following the granting of candidate status in 
December 2005, the 2006 NPAA retained the obligation of adopting such a law, even 
though according to the same government the law on languages was not an OFA 
obligation (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2006a). The references to the 
law as an OFA obligation are the result of the peculiar role assigned to the EU in post-
Ohrid Macedonia, as a monitor of the implementation of this agreement, which has 
been noted in the literature and was also confirmed by interlocutors. Anecdotally, the 
role of the EC is illustrated in the phrase used by many EC and EU officials: ‘the road 
to Brussels leads through Ohrid’.   
Despite these differences over whether or not it was an OFA obligation, until 
2006 this law was mentioned in the national strategic documents. Similarly, the 
Action Plan for European Partnership prepared at the same time as the 2006 National 
Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) foresaw the adoption of such a law in the 
first half of 2006 (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2006b). This is the only 
official document where the adoption of a law on the use of languages appears as an 
obligation by the government with a specific deadline, and was defined by a civil 
servant at the national level  as a ‘self-imposed obligation’.
6 Bearing in mind that in 
2006 there was no draft text of this law and that the parliamentary elections were 
already scheduled for the summer of 2006 it is likely that the outgoing government 
formally undertook this obligation, knowing that it would not be able to fulfil it before 
the end of its term of office. Following the change in government in the summer of 
2006, the law does not appear in subsequent planning documents, i.e. the NPAA 2007 
and 2008, indicating that it was not accepted by the new government as an obligation 
for EU accession (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2007a, 2008).  Kacarska, Minority Policies and EU Conditionality 
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However, in the summer of 2008, following a change of the minority party in 
government, a breakthrough occurred when the parliament adopted a law regulating 
the use of languages following a proposal by the Democratic Union for Integration 
(DUI), the Albanian party in government at the time. The law was swiftly placed on 
the agenda without going through the regular consultation procedures. The adoption 
of the law was actually part of a previous agreement between the ruling party Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National 
Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and DUI, the so-called “May Agreement”, an informal 
arrangement which enabled DUI to return to parliament following several months of 
boycott in 2007. As reported by a local newspaper, preparation and adoption of a law 
on the use of languages was part of this understanding.
7 Recent studies of EU 
involvement in Macedonia have argued that ‘the May agreement case can be 
perceived as some sort of a turning point for EU involvement in ethnic conflict 
management in Macedonia as this process has been marked by the increasing 
persuasive role of the EU’ (Markovic et al., 2011). A member of the Macedonian 
Parliament explained that the law was significant for DUI, because ‘the Albanians, 
DUI especially, needed a symbol that this issue was resolved’.
8 
Even though the EC and the government in power from 2006 did not consider 
the law to be an element of EU accession conditionality prior to its adoption, the 
regular progress reports and the national documents for European integration have 
nevertheless covered the progress in its implementation since 2008. Hence, the 2008 
Progress Report from the EC acknowledges its adoption and considers that ‘it clarifies 
and extends the scope for the use of non-majority languages at all levels of state and 
local self-government […]’ (EC, 2008). However, the EC also notes that ‘the law 
does not sufficiently address the use of languages of the smaller ethnic communities’ 
(ibid). A year later, the EC noted that there had been some progress in implementation 
of the law, with some chairpersons of parliamentary committees beginning to use 
Albanian; however little progress could be reported regarding use of the languages of 
smaller ethnic communities (EC, 2009). Hence, since adoption of the law, the EC has 
begun monitoring its implementation, although originally the issue was not part of the 
EU conditions.  
Similarly, as in the case of the European official documents, following its 
adoption, the national documents such as the NPAA and the national contributions to 
the progress reports consider the law on the use of languages to be an element of EU JEMIE 2012, 3 
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conditionality and reflect upon the plans and progress in its implementation. Although 
the 2009 NPAA does not undertake any specific obligations directed towards its 
implementation and does not address the issue of use of languages of the smaller 
ethnic communities, the law is included as an element on which the country reports in 
the context of its EU accession process (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 
2009). The 2010 NPAA underlines that efforts will be made to extend the use of this 
law to state institutions where this was previously not possible due to the lack of 
technical equipment, thereby “justifying” its feeble implementation to Brussels 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2010). Nevertheless, both documents 
mention the law on the use of languages as an issue that is being monitored in the 
context of the country’s EU accession. 
Both national and EC officials interviewed for this research had contrasting 
views on the role of the law as an element of EU accession conditionality. On the one 
hand, EC interviewees in Brussels expected this law to be one of the main issues that 
would be included in the accession negotiations, thereby illustrating that the issue has 
firmly entered the array of EU political criteria. On the other hand, EC interviewees in 
Skopje stressed that the law was not an issue of interest to the EC in the accession 
process.
9 This conflict within the EC itself underlines the problems of stipulating 
conditionality in the absence of clear EU rules. For national officials the law has 
become part of conditionality, and they stressed the change of the EC approach from 
considering the issue to be outside of its competences to its gradual inclusion in 
conditionality.
10  
Having in mind the mixed record of EU and national documents, as well as the 
interview data regarding the adoption and implementation of this specific law, it is 
very difficult to draw a precise conclusion on the role of EU conditionality. While the 
law was not a specific obligation according to the Progress Reports and the 
European/Accession Partnerships, after its adoption it became an element of EU 
conditionality which blurred the distinction between the impetus for change coming 
from the European or the national levels. This case clearly illustrates the role domestic 
politics plays in feeding into conditionality and its bottom-up dimension, which has 
important implications for its analysis. With this conclusion, the analysis largely 
confirms the findings of authors such as Brusis who emphasize the importance of 
domestic factors in the outcomes of conditionality in areas not regulated by the acquis 
(Brusis, 2005). Moreover, both the EU and national authorities had differing views of Kacarska, Minority Policies and EU Conditionality 
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the inclusion/non-inclusion of this law as a condition of EU accession, clearly 
pointing to a lack of consensus between and within these two groups of stakeholders. 
Lastly, the law on languages is an example of the “informal” channels used by EC 
officials in their communication with national stakeholders. 
Equitable representation of non-majority communities  
The equitable representation of minorities, unlike the law on languages, was clearly 
an element of the OFA and the EU conditions pertaining to Macedonia.
11 In essence 
this policy requires that the country achieves proportional representation of minorities 
at all levels of public administration, including in the judiciary and public enterprises. 
The origins of the condition related to the equitable representation are in the OFA and 
the SAA reports, although stronger emphasis has been given to the issue since 2005 
with the Progress Reports. The need for achieving equitable representation was 
clearly highlighted in the Analytical Report of 2005 and has been continuously raised 
as an issue of concern by the EC (EC, 2005). Similarly, in 2006 the EC put forward 
both a short-term and mid-term priority in the European Partnership requiring the 
adoption and implementation of a medium-term strategic plan for equitable 
representation in the public administration (Council of the European Union, 2006). In 
2008 this priority was repeated, with an emphasis on the need for its upgrading and 
enforcement (Council of the European Union, 2008). As part of the 
European/Accession partnerships, equitable representation was part of the highest 
form of EU conditionality on which progress of the country was evaluated.  
The obligations in relation to equitable representation can also be found in 
national documents. The 2006 NPAA undertakes an obligation to adopt a Medium-
Term Strategy for Adequate and Equitable Representation of members of 
Communities in the Public Administration (Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia, 2006a). Similarly, the strategy is part of the Action Plan for European 
Partnership 2005 with a deadline of mid-2006 (Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia, 2006b). Bearing in mind the political sensitivity of the issue, the 
likelihood of adopting such a medium-term strategy within half a year prior to the 
parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2006 was unlikely at the time. One can 
compare this case to the issue on the adoption of a law on the use of languages, as an 
activity taken up by an outgoing government largely aware that it would not be able to 
fulfil it by the end of its term. However, unlike the law on languages, which was taken JEMIE 2012, 3 
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off the EU agenda for a couple of years, this strategy was adopted in January 2007 by 
the new government. Not surprisingly, the EU facilitated the adoption of this strategic 
document through an EU-funded project which provided technical assistance from EU 
experts during its preparation, as was explained by a civil servant involved in the 
drafting process.
12  Since 2008, it has been taken as a basis in national documents for 
the further promotion of equitable representation of the non-majority communities 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2008).  Furthermore, the NPAA 2008 is 
the first government document which refers to the allocation of funds for the strategy 
and undertakes to report on its implementation on a quarterly basis.  
Hence, since 2008, the Secretariat, the institution responsible for 
implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement at the central level, which is headed 
by an Albanian vice prime minister, has been allocated funds for managing the hiring 
process for equitable representation annually. The significance of this institution was 
constantly highlighted during interviews for this paper. An EU official in Skopje 
called it ‘the biggest employment agency in the country, hiring approximately 300-
400 people per year, which means that the Employment Agency can’t do what this 
Secretariat is doing’.
13 A briefing paper from a local think tank has recently 
highlighted that data from the Central Registry of Civil Servants depict a 
commendable increase in the number of ethnic Albanians in the civil service from 
5.61% in 2004 to 24.18% in 2012 (Risteska, 2012). 
Despite this statistical increase, at the same time the policy has been criticized 
for lack of transparency in its implementation and for neglecting the needs of smaller 
communities. With regard to transparency, the absence of reliable data on employees 
has been of primary significance.  In a commentary on the effective participation of 
minorities in the public life, the CoE’s Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities highlighted that ‘comprehensive 
data and statistics are crucial to evaluate the impact of recruitment, promotion and 
other related practices on minority participation in public services. They are 
instrumental to devise adequate legislative and policy measures to address the 
shortcomings identified’ (Council of Europe, 2008). Already in 2007 the government 
highlighted that ‘the adopted Strategy [...] envisages the possibility for setting up a 
state authority in charge for processing data on the employees in the public sector. 
Presumably the State Statistical Office will be in charge’ (Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia, 2007b). This obligation was not fulfilled by the end of 2011, Kacarska, Minority Policies and EU Conditionality 
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as was highlighted by a national civil servant, because the focus was constantly on the 
statistical increase of non-majority communities.
14   
In addition, reports on recruitment of employees that are only employed on 
paper rather than in practice have been a common occurrence. In my interviews it was 
estimated that around 1,000 people have been hired to boost statistics, and are paid 
from the state budget, but are not formally working.
15 In 2009, the vice prime minister 
responsible for these recruitments recognized that a number of people have been hired 
and are not working in practice (Trajkovska, 2009). A 2010 International Crisis Group 
report highlighted that ‘hiring ethnic Albanians also risks becoming a ‘box ticking 
exercise’ in which many new employees have no clearly defined job description, 
office or equipment’ (International Crisis Group, 2011). The 2011 EC Progress 
Report highlights that ‘a large number of newly recruited civil servants received 
salaries, even though they were not assigned any tasks or responsibilities’ (EC, 
2011a). 
Lastly, implementation of this policy has been criticized for the lack of 
attention paid to non-Albanian communities present in the country. This tendency has 
been noted in numerous EU reports, which highlight that representation of smaller 
communities, particularly Turkish and Roma, in the civil service remains low (EC, 
2010). A recent policy brief presented the following numbers: in 2010 Turks and 
Roma, who represent 3.85% and 2.66% of the population in Macedonia, comprised 
only 1.49% or 0.64% in the civil service respectively (Risteska, 2012). Most of my 
interlocutors noted this tendency, although they highlighted that despite these regular 
reports, there was no increased involvement of the EU on the issue. A civil servant 
interviewee pointed out that the EU has not increased pressure on the matter, despite 
the evident ‘appropriation of this policy by the Albanian community’.
16 Generally, the 
widespread opinion was that the EC prioritized the employment of one community 
and neglected that of others.  
Overall, the above analysis of the role EU conditionality has played in 
securing equitable representation of communities in Macedonia points to a set of 
divergent conclusions. The EU documents and the interviews indicate that since the 
signing of the OFA this policy has been at the forefront of EU conditionality and was 
supported by EU funds and assistance. At the same time, the government responded 
formally with Action Plans and employment of non-majority communities. While 
these results indicate that the role of EU conditionality in supporting domestic policy JEMIE 2012, 3 
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makers in this field could be considered positive, at a substantive level the policy has 
been accompanied by numerous problems. Domestic actors and interaction in the 
local context resulted in mixed results and highlighted the need for re-examination of 
the methods of implementation. Although there was no major domestic opposition to 
equitable representation, the policy was not put into practice as expected. In many 
cases employment has only been on paper, has violated the principle of merit and has 
not taken into consideration the needs of smaller communities. These findings, in 
turn, point to the potential abuse of EU conditionality at the national level and its 
possible unwanted consequences. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The study of political conditionality in the context of EU accession has been burdened 
with questions over its effectiveness and outcome. Conditionality in the context of 
minority policies has been a specific source of contention because of the lack of 
unified standards at the EU level and political sensitivity surrounding the issue. In the 
Western Balkans, due to the legacy of war, these issues have gained even greater 
significance. Not surprisingly, in October 2011 the EC announced that the first and 
the last chapters to be opened and closed in the upcoming accession negotiations 
would be Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, 
Freedom and Security), which would be continuously monitored based on specific 
benchmarks and action plans (EC, 2011b).
17 Hence, conditionality in relation to 
minority policies would be on the agenda, especially in light of countries in the region 
opening up accession negotiations.  
With this in mind, and using tools from the previous enlargement, this paper 
extended the study of EU conditionality and minority policies to the Western Balkans 
and the case of Macedonia. The diverse trajectories of the two policies examined 
highlighted the need for contextualized analysis of the EU’s impact. The dynamics of 
EU and national interactions in relation to the law on languages and the equitable 
representation policy illustrate the difficulties of dealing with conditionality as an 
independent variable. First, as indicated by the example of the law on languages, 
conditions change over time and there is no consensus over what conditionality 
entails. Since issues and policies can become elements of conditionality along the 
way, an examination over a longer period of time is indispensible for understanding Kacarska, Minority Policies and EU Conditionality 
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the complexities of EU conditionality. Due to these changes over time, it is not 
surprising that there is generally no consensus both within and among national and 
EU stakeholders as to the conditions in such a policy area, which is not regulated by 
the acquis. The law on languages also illustrates the informal dimensions of 
conditionality, which cannot be grasped through an external incentives model.  
On the other hand, even when there is consensus between the EU and national 
authorities - as in the case of the equitable representation policy - exogenous factors at 
the national level (for example  political party) can lead to abuse of EU conditionality. 
In such cases the instrumental use of EU conditionality at the national level can 
contribute to the perpetuation of detrimental policies and even result in further 
polarization. The findings of this paper therefore question whether the “specific 
benchmarks and plans” announced by the EC in non-acquis areas will inevitably 
breed effective policies. From an analytical perspective, this paper highlights the 
complexity of the conditionality mechanism, and supports the findings of previous 
empirical studies which argue that this phenomenon should be studied as a process 
that takes into consideration both formal and informal features.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 In cases when the paper deals with topics in relation to the heading on minority 
protection in the EU reports, it uses the term ‘minority’. When discussing national 
policies, the paper uses the term ‘non-majority community’ which has been 
introduced in the country’s legislation and political discourse to refer to all the 
communities following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001. Due 
to this contextual specificity, this paper uses both terms at the expense of uniformity 
of terminology.  
2 Acquis communautaire is a term referring to the European Community legislation 
and case law.  
3 On different aspects of EU conditionality see also Bieber (2011).  
4 Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 101/2008. 
5 Author’s interview with Member of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia in 
Skopje, December 2010. 
6 Author’s interview with a high-ranking civil servant from the Secretariat for 
European Affairs, December 2010. 
7 The Agreement is not available to the public, but its main points were summarised 
by a newspaper article at the time, VMRO-DPMNE and DUI hide the Agreement 
[VMRO – DPMNE i DUI go zatskrivaat dogovorot], Dnevnik daily newspaper, 30 
May 2007. 
http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=C13A64D422158841A5A52709A2C06E08&a
rc=1. JEMIE 2012, 3 
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8 Author’s interview with a Member of Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Skopje, December 2010 
9 Author’s interview with a European Commission official in Skopje, February 2011. 
10 Author’s interview with a high-level civil servant in the Ministry of Justice in 
Skopje, January 2011. 
11 For the first time, the equitable representation of communities in the case of 
Macedonia is guaranteed in the OFA (section 4.2.). The amended Constitutional 
article states that ‘equitable representation of persons belonging to all communities in 
public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life.’ In order to implement this 
provision, it was agreed that: The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the 
present Assembly amendments to the laws on the civil service and public 
administration to ensure equitable representation of communities in accordance with 
Section 4.2 of the Framework Agreement.  
12 Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European Affairs in 
Skopje, December 2010. 
13 Author’s interview with a European Commission official in Skopje, January 2011. 
14 Author’s interview with a civil servant from the Secretariat for European affairs, 
Skopje, 23 December 2010. 
15 Author’s interview with a OSCE representative in Skopje, January 2011. 
16 Author’s interview with a high-ranking civil servant from the Ministry of Justice in 
Skopje, 18 January 2011. 
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